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 Abstract 
This paper examines the state of sovereignty in post-integration Europe. Drawing on 
linguistic approaches to law and IR, it interrogates Neil Walker’s conception of ‘late 
sovereignty’, in terms of how it manages the problem of continuity and change in concepts in 
transition as well as the constitutive and regulative rules of late sovereignty games. The 
transition from what the paper calls ‘high sovereignty’ to ‘late sovereignty’ entails a 
broadening of the range of actors who play late sovereignty games to include non-sovereign 
state entities such as the EU, a redefinition of the ‘particularising’ element of ultimate 
authority from territory to function, and an evolution of the criteria for what constitutes a 
‘good’ sovereignty claim as stipulated by the regulative rules of late sovereignty games. It 
concludes by assessing the relevance of late sovereignty for the trilateral relationship between 
the non-continental territories of EU Member States, the Member states themselves and the 
EU.  
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Late Sovereignty in post-integration Europe: Continuity and change in a 
constitutive concept 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
International cooperation is not traditionally considered a threat to state sovereignty. Indeed it 
has been frequently argued that the ability to establish and maintain international relations is 
the very expression of sovereign status. (Waever 1995: 420). This is the case even where 
post-state institutions have been established, charged with formulating and executing policy 
decisions. (Lake 2007) However, the process of European integration, as a form of 
international cooperation as overseen by the institutions of the European Union (EU), 
presents a challenge the sovereignty of EU Member States (MS). This is due, it is submitted, 
to two particular features of European integration which distinguish EU membership from 
more traditional forms of international cooperation; constitutionalism and majority decision-
making.  
Constitutionalism relates to the collection of legal doctrines developed by the EU’s judicial 
arm – the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which resulted in its legal order evolving from a 
treaty under international law to an autonomous hierarchical legal order such that EU law 
became the ‘law of the land’ (Weiler 1991: 2415) in each of the EU’s MS. From the point of 
view of the sovereignty of EU MS, perhaps the most significant feature of this development 
was the supremacy doctrine, where national law, even national constitutional law, was to be 
subjected to the provisions of EU law in cases of conflict. (ECJ 1964) This doctrine 
challenged the legal supremacy of national constitutions as well as the political competence 
of national administrations whose activities would be now be subject to the provisions of EU 
law as enforced by domestic courts. 
 Secondly, in relation to political decision-making by the EU institutions, the loss of a 
veto by individual MS governments in the Council (the upper chamber of EU government 
representing the interests of MS) is the second significant feature of European integration that 
raises challenges to conventional understandings of sovereignty. (Keohane 2002: 748) From 
an early stage in European integration, the requirement of unanimity for voting in the Council 
of Ministers, where each MS has equal representation, was dispensed with such that EU MS 
were bound by decisions of law and policy, even where they explicitly voted against it.
1
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2. W (h) ither Sovereignty? 
 
Harbingers of the demise of sovereignty are not new. However, given the novelty and 
invasive nature of European integration as a form of international cooperation, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the experience of European integration has resulted in a renewal of the 
prophecy of the death of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the challenges European integration 
poses to the concept of sovereignty and the sovereignty of EU MS, sovereignty remains 
central to understanding European integration even if only to emphasize its irrelevance to the 
EU context. (Mac Amhlaigh 2009: 555).   
It is premature to conclude with MacCormick that some fundamental epistemic shift has 
taken place beyond understandings of sovereignty in legal and political practice in Europe 
from sovereignty to post-sovereignty. (MacCormick 1993) Such a position ignores the 
significance of sovereignty as the ‘object language’ (Walker 2003: 10) of domestic politics 
and its important role as a ‘bargaining resource for transnational politics’ (Keohane 1994) 
even in post-integration Europe.
2
  
Even if sovereignty can still be said to be relevant in the post-integration European context, 
however, it is also difficult to affirm with the liberal intergovernmentalists that European 
integration is simply another form of (sovereignty preserving) international cooperation 
(Moravcsik 1998).  The sheer breadth of national policies which owe their origins to policy 
formulated at the EU level, combined with the considerable autonomy of EU institutions and 
the invasive nature of EU law, render the claim that European integration is simply ‘business 
as usual’ in terms of international cooperation, increasingly hollow.  
Thus, rather than being redundant or remaining unchanged, sovereignty has evolved, where it 
still retains its purchase on law and politics (both national and supranational) but not in the 
form which it has taken in its hey-day of the Westphalian system of sovereign states. In order 
to appreciate precisely how sovereignty has changed in the European integration experience, 
some conceptual ground clearing is in order to understand continuity and change in what is a 
‘polysemous’ concept. (MacCormick, 2011). 
Following the ‘linguistic turn’ in International Relations (Aalberts 2004a) and (notably 
earlier) in jurisprudence (Hart 1994), the conception of sovereignty advanced in this 
contribution is that of a politico-legal concept which is an ‘institutional’ rather than a ‘brute’ 
fact. (Searle 1969: 50).  
The positing of sovereignty as a linguistically constituted institutional fact precludes a rigid 
conceptual analysis of the fate of sovereignty in European integration. As Bartelson notes, 
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such an approach would entail ‘identifying a class of properties as “essential” to statehood, 
thus demarcating “sovereignty” from deviant cases and eliminating obnoxious borderline 
cases by searching for ever more fine-grained qualitative difference. The desired outcome is a 
clarified concept, evident in its logical purity and the by the empirical giveness of its referent’ 
(Bartelson: 1995, 27). The problem with this approach is that it falls foul of the ‘descriptive 
fallacy’ that sovereignty corresponds to some objective reality whose meaning is fixed in all 
times and places. As an institutional fact, sovereignty does not relate to an empirically 
observable phenomena of power, but is rather a normative concept whose existence is 
contingent upon its usage or, more specifically, the rules governing its usage, in practice. 
(Werner & de Wilde 2001; Aalberts 2004a). Given that the meaning of sovereignty is 
contingent upon its usage in ‘sovereignty games’
3
 as prescribed by the rules of these games, 
its meaning, like the rules of language games, are subject to change and evolution. They are 
not inexorable but are rather, in Wittgenstein’s sense, customary (Wittgenstein 1968: PI, 
198). 
 As with all language games, sovereignty games contain rules that are central to the 
intelligibility of the practice qua sovereignty game. (Wittgenstein 1968: P 85). Moreover, 
following Searle’s refinement of rules and languages games, sovereignty games entail both 
constitutive and regulative rules (Searle. 1969).
4
 The former are constitutive of the practice 
itself in that they not only constitute the actors or participants in the practice, but also in the 
sense that they enable participants and observers to understand that a particular game, such as 
chess or football, is being played. The regulative rules, on the other hand, stipulate criteria for 
the execution of the practice constituted by the constitutive rules such as prescribing ways in 
which the practice can be undertaken and establishing criteria for engaging well in the 
practice. (Lindahl & Van Roermund 2000). 
It is in this respect, it is argued that the EU sovereignty experience is best understood. It is 
not irrelevant as the post-sovereigntists claim, but nor has it remained fixed; rather as with all 
linguistically-based concepts, it has evolved through the playing of sovereignty games from 
what can termed ‘high sovereignty’
5
 characterized by the Westphalian system of sovereign 
states, to what Neil Walker has dubbed ‘late sovereignty’. (Walker 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 
2010). 
 In the remainder of this contribution, the contours of late sovereignty in the EU context will 
be explored, with particular reference to the evolution of the constitutive and regulative rules 
of late sovereignty games and how they compare with those of ‘high sovereignty’ games. It 
concludes by analyzing how the evolution of sovereignty from its high to late phases can 
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shed light on the trilateral relationship between Overseas Countries and Territories of EU MS 
(OCTS), their metropoles, that is, EU MS and the EU itself. 
 
3. From High Sovereignty to Late Sovereignty 
 
The form of sovereignty which has dominated international law and international relations in 
modern history is high sovereignty characterized by the Westphalian state system where 
sovereignty and statehood were synonymous. According to Krasner, the era of high 
sovereignty can be traced back to the mid-1700s.
6
  
The constitutive and regulative rules of these high sovereignty games are reasonably well 
understood. Following Searle’s formulation of institutional facts as ‘X counts of Y in context 
C’, (Searle 1969: 35) and emphasizing the constitutive function of the rules in constituting 
the actors in the game, Werner and de Wilde posit the constitutive rules of high sovereignty 
games in the following formulation: a ‘political collective (X) counts as a state (Y) in the 
context of a sovereignty discourse (C)’, where a claim to sovereignty ‘attempts to establish a 
relation as an institutional fact … and a set of right and responsibilities‘. (Werner & deWilde 
2003; 292). These rights and responsibilities are a combination of what Krasner has termed 
Westphalian and International Legal Sovereignty (Krasner 1999: 9) expressed in terms of 
internal ultimate authority over territory and people and external equality.  
 Moreover, the regulative rules of these high sovereignty games evolved from the earlier 
justifications of absolute monarchy and imperial conquest to claims of nationhood, popular 
sovereignty and the right to self-determination. (Werner & deWilde 2001: 295). The post-war 
proliferation of post-state institutions and legal regimes such as the UN and GATT, as well as 
phenomena such as globalization, has provoked a rethink of the high sovereign era and its 
characteristic sovereign state system. (Falk 2002). This trend has been most intense in Europe 
and Neil Walker’s conception of late sovereignty provides an attempt to give an account of 
the post-high sovereignty era in the light of European integration. (Walker 2003, 2008a, 
2008b, 2010). As Walker argues, late sovereignty entails a number of features in the 
discursive career of the concept of sovereignty ‘continuity, distinctiveness, irreversibility and 
transformative potential. (Walker 2003: 19).  
The balance between continuity and change, or as Walker terms it, continuity and 
distinctiveness, is crucial to the evolution of the concept of sovereignty and the move from 
high to late sovereignty in the post-integration European experience. The meaning of 
sovereignty from its ‘high’ period must retain some purchase in late sovereignty games such 
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that they can be cognized as sovereignty games. As such, the practices of late sovereignty in 
European integration must be intelligible as a form of sovereignty game and not something 
else; that is not, for example, post-sovereignty where the practices can be understood as not-
sovereignty games, in the same way that throwing chess pieces around the room can be 
understood as not-chess playing. Thus, late sovereignty cannot be a negation of sovereignty.
7
 
Therefore, the important element of continuity, which is central to the intelligibility of post-
integration European late sovereignty games, features in Walker’s account of late sovereignty 
in terms of the idea of ultimate authority. By retaining a ‘focal meaning’ (Finnis 1980: 9) of 
sovereignty as a form of ultimate authority, Walker argues, the ‘deep conceptual structure of 
sovereignty’ is preserved. (Walker 2003: 23) 
With regard to the change side of the equation, the evolutionary element of late as opposed to 
high sovereignty, features in a number of respects in late sovereignty. First of all, as noted, in 
high sovereignty games, the ‘particularizing’ element of the ultimate authority claim related 
to territory and people. In late sovereignty games, however, the limiting element of 
sovereignty and the demarcation of one sovereign claim from another, relates, not spatially, 
that is not to territory, but rather to function. (Walker 2003: 22). Thus in late sovereignty 
autonomy does not imply territorial exclusivity. Post-integration Europe constitutes a 
landscape of functionally differentiated late sovereignty claims which do not impugn the 
integrity of other claims. A corollary of this is that in late sovereignty games the hegemony of 
states in sovereignty games has been challenged. In late sovereignty games, the range of 
participants has expanded to include polities which do not fit the classic state model such as 
the EU. This, therefore, allows for the mutual late sovereignty claims of the EU and Member 
States, and does not result in a zero-sum resolution of sovereignty at either level, national or 
supranational. In terms of the constitutive rules of late sovereignty games, then, late 
sovereignty can be said to relate to an institutional plausible claim (X) to ultimate authority 
over a specific functional domain (Y) in the context of a supranational political discourse (C).  
Moreover, in late sovereignty games, the criteria stipulated by the regulative rules have 
expanded beyond the traditional canons of high sovereignty games. Whereas, the tropes of 
high sovereignty games are still present in late sovereignty games (see below), other 
justifications for sovereignty claims not based on ideals of popular sovereignty or constituent 
power have been added. Thus, the late sovereign claim to ultimate authority over a particular 
functional domain can, itself, be justified on functional grounds as a form of what Fritz 
Scharpf has termed ‘out-put legitimacy’. (Scharpf 1999). 
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4. EU Late Sovereignty Games in Practice 
 
The evolution of the rules of sovereignty games from high to late can be seen in the claims 
made at both the supranational and national levels in the context of the European integration 
process. For example, the ECJ’s claims to the direct effect and primacy of EU law are 
characteristic of late sovereignty claims in the sense that they are made not by a nation state 
but a supranational institution and constitute a claim to functional autonomy based on 
consequentialist or out-put considerations. In constitutionalizing the EU Treaty system, the 
Court made a claim to ultimate authority over the functions governed by EU law by claiming 
that: 
‘the … Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between 
the contracting states … [t]he Community constitutes a new legal order … for the benefit of 
which states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects 
of which comprise not only their Member States but also their nationals’. (ECJ 1963: 12.)  
This was complemented in the subsequent Costa judgment with a claim to the autonomy of 
the EU legal order, resulting in its primacy over national law. (ECJ 1964: 594). In this case 
the Court claimed that accession to the (then) Community constituted a ‘permanent 
limitation’ of EU MS sovereign rights (ECJ 1964: 594), the implication being that the EU 
was now sovereign in the areas where the MS’s sovereign powers had been limited. 
 In developing the doctrine of the direct effect and primacy of EU law, the Court justified this 
sovereignty claim not on ideas of a constituent power, nor on the right to the self-
determination of an EU people, but in true late sovereign fashion, on functional grounds. In 
Costa, the Court found that unless the legal system enjoyed ultimate authority over its 
functional domains that ‘the realisation of the aims envisaged by the Treaty’ would be 
endangered (ECJ 1964: 455) and that the effectiveness of EU law would be impugned. (ECJ 
1964: 456). These early cases constitute the foundational iterations of the EU’s late 
sovereignty claims over the past fifty or so years of its operation. A more recent and 
prominent iteration was the Court’s decision in Kadi. (ECJ 2008) The case involved a 
complex clash of the UN and EU legal orders with respect to provisions for the freezing of 
assets associated with terrorist financing. In finding that the EU measure which implemented 
the UN Security Council decision regulating terrorist financing violated fundamental rights 
protected by the EU legal order, the Court stressed the autonomy of the EU’s legal order 
finding that it constituted an ‘autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by an 
international agreement’. (ECJ 2008: 316). This rather robust claim to the autonomy (and 
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therefore ultimate authority) of the EU legal order was made, not as against the legal orders 
of EU MS which was the case in Van Gend and Costa, but outwardly towards the legal order 
of the United Nations and the international community. Moreover, the justification of this late 
sovereignty claim in Kadi was not precisely the same as that in these earlier cases. In Kadi 
this late sovereignty claim was based, not only on the achievement of the aims of the treaty as 
in Costa, but also on the ‘principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms’ embedded in, and protected by, the EU’s (autonomous) legal order 
(ECJ 2008: 303).
8
  
Even if the actors of high sovereignty games i.e. states also play late sovereignty games and 
justify their claims according to the tenets of high sovereignty, they have not remained 
unaffected by the evolution from high to late sovereignty. The sovereignty claims of EU MS 
in the context of European integration, it is argued, are representative more of late than high 
sovereignty games.  
Firstly, unqualified and categorical assertions of ultimate authority over territory and people 
by EU MS have tended to be replaced by more temperate claims of residual authority in late 
sovereignty games, which take into account the MS’s commitments to European integration. 
(Kumm 2005) In terms of the conventional justifications proffered by particular MS in high 
sovereignty games, moreover, these have undergone a transition from one form of high 
sovereignty justification to another form in that member state due to the integration process. 
Two examples from EU Member States illustrate this point; the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) ‘Lisbon decision’ of 2009, and the UK’s European Union Act 
of 2011. 
In June 2009, the GFCC handed down its decision on a challenge to German ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty of 2008. (GFCC 2009) The Court found that such ratification would not 
per se violate the German basic law. In doing so, it asserted German sovereignty at various 
junctures in the judgment accompanied by justifications of its sovereignty claims by 
reference to the classic tropes of high sovereignty such as constituent power, popular 
sovereignty and self-determination (GFCC 2009: para. 204, 223, 310). These uses of high 
sovereignty justifications for German sovereignty by the GFCC are, by themselves, 
unremarkable. However, what characterizes them as late, rather than high sovereignty claims, 
it is submitted, is the particular context within which these justifications were put forward; 
namely the post-war German state. In the reconstruction of post-war Germany, and 
particularly in the drafting of the basic law, the previously unhappy experiences with popular 
sovereignty were suppressed in favour of a strong assertion of the rule of law and the 
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supremacy of the basic law over the political process. This was copper-fastened in the basic 
law itself through an absolute prohibition on the holding of referendums or plebiscites, 
(Mollers 2006) and it was explicitly recognized by the GFCC itself in the Lisbon decision 
where it found that: 
‘The Basic Law’ … breaks with all forms of political Machiavellianism and with a rigid 
concept of sovereignty which until the beginning of the 20
th
 century regarded the right to 
wage war – even a war of aggression – as a right due to sovereign state as a matter of course’ 
(GFCC 2009: para. 199).  
Thus, the post-war German constitutional landscape was marked by a prominent and well-
respected constitutional court, which regularly struck down the laws of the Bundestag for 
violating the provisions of the German basic law. (Kommers 1997). Thus, post-war German 
sovereignty was grounded less on constituent power and popular sovereignty as expressed 
through the use of referendums and more on a ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas 1998) 
with a ‘sovereign’ basic law.
9
 Against this background the justificatory claims of German 
sovereignty in the Lisbon decision, based on popular sovereignty, a German constituent 
power and self-determination mark a shift from the constitutional patriotism which has 
underpinned and justified German sovereignty in the post-war era.  
Unlike the post-war German experience, the UK constitutional tradition prioritizes the 
political institution of Parliament over the written law through the foundational doctrine of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty, which has become both the claim and justification of UK 
sovereignty in the high sovereignty period. (Goldsworthy 1999). Thus the ‘high sovereignty’ 
claims of the UK have taken the form of expressions of parliamentary sovereignty, justified 
by reference to its ‘facticity’ whether historical or political. (Wade 1955: 157-8). 
However, the justification of Parliamentary sovereignty in UK constitutional discourse has 
been undergoing a shift in the past decade or so due, inter alia to the European integration 
project, marking the passage from high sovereignty to late sovereignty in the UK. Firstly, 
judicial pronouncements, most notably from the UK’s former highest court, the House of 
Lords,
10
 have suggested that the justification of parliamentary sovereignty is not based on its 
(circular) ‘facticity’ but rather on its acceptance by the common law. (House of Lords 2005) 
However, perhaps more significantly, the European Union Act 2011 illustrates the passage 
from high sovereignty to late sovereignty in the UK context. 
Two features of the Act, in particular, provide evidence of this. Firstly, s. 18 of the Act, the 
‘sovereignty clause’, states, in paradigmatic late sovereignty mode, that EU law ‘falls to be 
recognised and available in law in the United Kingdom only by virtue of Acts [of 
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Parliament].’ (UK Parliament 2011: s. 18). Secondly, and more strikingly from the point of 
view of the transition from high to late sovereignty games, are the series of referendum locks 
which are contained in the Act itself. For example, s. 2(2) of the Act provides that EU 
Treaties shall not be ratified by the UK unless a referendum has been held approving the 
reforms. The referendum locks mark an assertion of UK sovereignty claims in the sense that 
they require that all Treaty amendments are subject to a national referendum approving the 
changes. However, what makes this a late rather than a ‘high’ sovereign claim is the way in 
which it marks a shift in the foundation and justification of UK sovereignty, from 
Parliamentary sovereignty to popular sovereignty. Constitutionally speaking, the referendum 
requirements seem to suggest a shift in conceptions of Parliamentary sovereignty from a 
‘continuing’ to a ‘self-embracing’ form (Hart 1994: 149) which would seem to be supported 
by recent judicial attitudes to Parliamentary sovereignty. However, perhaps more strikingly 
from the viewpoint of the regulative rules of UK sovereignty, the introduction of referendum 
requirements such as that of s. 2(2) seem to suggest a shift in justification of UK sovereignty, 
from the fact of parliamentary sovereignty to popular sovereignty. This shift is all the more 
apparent given that popular sovereignty and constituent power as a justification of UK 
sovereignty has been virtually absent in UK constitutional discourse for the majority of the 
‘high sovereign’ period (Loughlin 2006).  
In sum, in the playing of late sovereignty games in the European integration context we can 
see how the constitutive and regulative rules of late sovereignty are followed by the 
participants. The late sovereignty claims of the EU reflect the evolution of the constitutive 
rules of high sovereignty games albeit that the focal meaning of sovereignty is retained in its 
sense of ultimate authority over particular functional domains. Moreover, the evolution of the 
regulative rules of late sovereignty games are apparent in the fluidity of the justification of 
functional autonomy, both at the EU but also the MS level as seen in the examples from the 
UK and Germany.  
 
5. Late Sovereignty Games and OCTs 
 
What light can European late sovereignty games shine on the trilateral relationship between 
OCT, metropole and EU? As the introduction to the study explains, OCTs are non-
continental colonial territories of EU Member States which have resisted the urge to assert 
independence in the post-war era of decolonization for economic, political and geographic 
reasons.
11
 As well as this, the EU itself has a stake in OCTs as specifically provided for in 
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various EU treaty provisions, which make special exemptions and provisions for these 
territories from inter alia the rules governing the single market.
12
 These exemptions and 
concessions are regulated at the EU level making the EU a significant actor in the governance 
of these territories. As the editors state, this results in a trilateral relationship between OCT, 
MS and the EU, with post-colonial relevance.  
 In terms of the agency of the OCTs themselves, they are, perhaps, best characterized by their 
reluctance to play high sovereignty games, that is claiming ultimate authority over a 
particular territory (usually islands) and people based on regulative rules such as the right to 
self-determination.
13
 Therefore, the late sovereignty games paradigm in the EU context may 
open up a space for OCTs to make late sovereignty claims regarding particular functions 
without resulting in independence (and therefore abandonment by the metropole) which 
would result from making high sovereignty claims. As discussed in the previous sections, the 
characteristics of late sovereignty games include the agency of actors as participants in late 
sovereignty games which do not fit the mould of sovereign statehood. Therefore like the EU, 
OCTs as non-sovereign state actors can play late sovereignty games making claims to 
functional autonomy rather than territorial exclusivity.  
 Moreover, as noted above, the disjunction between sovereignty and statehood in late 
sovereignty games is accompanied by a broadening of the repertoire of justifications for late 
sovereignty claims such as the functional and normative justifications of EU sovereignty by 
the ECJ. This expansion of the repertoire of regulative criteria for late sovereignty claims as 
compared with high sovereignty claims, means that there are more options available to OCTs 
to substantiate their late sovereignty claim to functional autonomy beyond the high 
sovereignty form of popular sovereignty and self-determination (providing the foundation for 
the undesired goal of independence). Thus, the functional autonomy of OCTs can be justified 
according to the ‘special status’ of these territories predicated on functional justifications 
including geographic, demographic and economic factors which have been formally 
recognized at the EU level, such as Articles 198 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.
14
 
What results when applying the paradigm of late sovereignty games to the trilateral 
relationship between OCT-metropole-EU, then, is a ‘variegated federal landscape of 
governance’ (Baldacchino current volume: pp?) where ultimate authority claims based on 
functional autonomy are made at different levels of the trilateral relationship. Thus, the multi-
level governance resulting from the playing of late sovereignty games in the trilateral 
relationship is a vindication, rather than the negation, of the role and relevance of sovereignty 
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in post-integration Europe (Aalberts 2004b), even if only one of the participants in these 
sovereignty games fits the typology of agency in high sovereignty games. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this contribution, the EU sovereignty experience was analysed through the notion of late 
sovereignty. If ‘high sovereignty’ dominated the sovereignty games of the past two hundred 
years or so, then the post-war experience of European integration can be said to mark the 
transition from high sovereignty to late sovereignty. Neil Walker’s account of late 
sovereignty was then unpacked in order to understand both how late sovereignty remains a 
conception of sovereignty and not post-sovereignty, as well as analysing precisely how the 
constitutive and regulative rules of late sovereignty games differ from those of high 
sovereignty. This paradigm of late sovereignty was then illustrated by reference to 
sovereignty claims made within the EU context by EU MS as well as the EU itself. It was 
argued that the late sovereignty paradigm is also a better way of understanding the complex 
trilateral relationship between OCTs, the metropole and the EU, as late sovereignty claims do 
not imply statehood and autonomy can be asserted in ways which do not imply or lead to 
statehood. In conclusion, sovereignty is alive and well in twenty first century Europe even if 
the dominance of the state is in decline. 
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1
 Majority voting was introduced in 1966 as part of the ‘third stage’ of the transitional development of the then 
European Economic Community. This development was not unproblematic and gave rise to the empty chair 
crises and the Luxembourg compromise. (Teasdale, 1993) Nonetheless, majority voting has been applied to 
ever-wider policy areas in the form of qualified majority voting such that it is now the primary method of 
decision-making at EU level. (Christiansen & Reh 2009) 
2
 As much was clear from the ratification debates of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands and 
the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland. It would be simplistic to conclude that concerns over national sovereignty was the 
cause of the failure to pass the referendums in these cases, however, sovereignty was certainly prominent in the 
debates. For the Irish context, see (Laffan 2008). 
3
 The notion of ‘sovereignty games’ is reasonably well understood in IR literature (Jackson 1990), (Sorenson 
1999). However, as Werner and de Wilde point out, much of the literature on sovereignty games presupposes 
the state as an immutable fact. (Werner & de Wilde: 2001, 291-292) The notion of sovereignty as an 
institutional fact, however, presupposes the inverse, that the games qua discourse constitute the actors engaged 
in the game. As Aalberts puts it ‘.. the rules ..constitute the fact, - they are the conditions of possibility of the 
very activity, which could not happen or ‘be’ except for the defining rules (as set out by language).’ (Aalberts 
2004a: 249). 
4
 ‘I want to clarify a distinction between two different sorts of rules, which I shall call regulative and 
constitutive rules … As a start, we might say that regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently 
existing forms of behavior; for example, many rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2011/35 
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independently of the rules. But constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of 
behavior. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but as it 
were they create the very possibility of playing such games.’ (Searle 1969: 33) 
5
 Following the periodization of history such as, for example, the early, high and late middle ages. 
6
 Krasner attributes the introduction of idea of the equality implicit in international legal sovereignty to 
Emmerich de Vattel and particularly his Le droit de gens of 1758. Westphalian sovereignty, on the other hand, 
relating to internal autonomy, has, Krasner argues, virtually nothing to do with the eponymous Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648. The principle of the internal autonomy of states was not clearly articulated until the 
eighteenth century by Wolff and Vattel. (Krasner: 1999, 14-20).  
7
 In this regard, notwithstanding the evolutionary potential of all language games, particularly on Wittgenstein’s 
scheme, the language game of late sovereignty must retain some basic idea of what sovereignty means such that 
it can be understood that sovereignty games are still being played. Thus, even if we accept that the meaning of 
language is conventional and not essential, as well as the fact that it is evolutionary, both with reference to its 
constitutive and regulative rules, if language is to perform its primary function, that of communication, then the 
meaning or intelligibility of speech acts must retain some sort of central or ‘focal’ meaning. If the meaning of 
concepts is constantly up for grabs, then communication through language becomes impossible. I understand 
Cavell to be making a similar argument to this. (Cavell 1958). 
8
 For discussion see (Mac Amhlaigh 2011). 
9
 This is perhaps most evident in the GFCC’s ‘battles’ with the ECJ over fundamental rights protection in the 
EU legal system; the so-called ‘solange’ case law where the Court deferred to the jurisdiction of the ECJ as long 
as it deemed the protection of fundamental rights in EU law to be the equivalent of that of the German basic 
law. The assertion of sovereignty in this case, it is submitted, being the sovereignty of the German basic law 
over EU law. See (Kumm 1999) 
10
 In 2009, the UK Supreme Court replaced the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords as the highest Court 
in the UK pursuant to the reforms of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. 
11
 See the introduction and Baldacchino’s introduction to the current volume. 
12
 For a clear example of this in the context of EU financial regulation, see Vlcek’s contribution to the current 
volume. More generally see (Ziller 1999) and (Kochenov 2009). 
13
 For discussion, see Baldachino’s contribution to the current volume. 
14
 Article 198 of the TFEU provides that ‘ the Member States agree to associated with the Union the non-
European countries and territories which have special relations with Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom [listed in an Annex to the Treaty] … The purpose of association shall be to promote the 
economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations 
between them and the Union as a whole. In accordance with the principles set out in the preamble to this Treaty, 
association shall serve primarily to further the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and 
territories in order to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development to which they aspire.’ More 
strikingly in this regard, Article 349 TFEU provides that: ‘Taking account of the structural social and economic 
situation of Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, 
Madeira and the Canary Islands, which is compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult 
topography and climate, economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which 
severely restrain their development, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of 
application of the Treaties to those regions, including common policies. Where the specific measures in question 
are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act on a proposal 
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament. The measures referred to in the first 
paragraph concern in particular areas such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture 
and fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential consumer goods, State aids and 
conditions of access to structural funds and to horizontal Union programmes. The Council shall adopt the 
measures referred to in the first paragraph taking into account the special characteristics and constraints of the 
outermost regions without undermining the integrity and the coherence of the Union legal order, including the 
internal market and common policies.’ 
